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TESTING TITLE VII’S PATIENCE? THE NEED 
FOR BETTER REMEDIES WHEN STATE 
“TEACHER TESTING” REQUIREMENTS HAVE A 
DISPARATE IMPACT ON EMPLOYMENT 
OPPORTUNITIES FOR MINORITY 
POPULATIONS  
I. INTRODUCTION 
The failures of education reform efforts have led to increased demands for 
accountability from schools, teachers, and students.1 Unfortunately, while 
every new federal education bill comes with “lofty statements, more 
programs and higher spending,”2 there has been no corresponding increase in 
achievement during the past forty years.3 The demands for accountability 
 1. See Mary Lord, Teaching America, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REPORT, Jan. 28/Feb. 4, 2002, at 
28, 28-29 (discussing various accountability measures in the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001 Pub. 
L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002), the most recent federal education legislation, including annual 
school “report cards” to enable parents to compare their child’s performance against that of students in 
similar schools and annual testing of students in grades three through eight in both reading and math); 
Mary Alice Barksdale-Ladd & Karen F. Thomas, What’s At Stake in High-Stakes Testing: Teachers 
and Parents Speak Out, 51 J. TCHR. EDUC. 384, 384 (2000) (stating that publication of NATIONAL 
COMMISSION ON EXCELLENCE IN EDUCATION , A NATION AT RISK  (1983), which compared the 
decline in the quality of education to unilateral educational disarmament, has been the impetus of a 
“focused march” toward accountability and high-stakes testing); Chris E. Vance, Comment, Teacher 
Competency Testing: “Decertification” and the Federal Constitution and Title VII, 37 EMORY L.J. 
1077, 1077 (1988) (stating that the American public has demanded educational accountability because 
of the widely publicized inadequacies of public education); Hagit Elul, Note, Making the Grade, 
Public Education Reform: The Use of Standardized Testing to Retain Students and Deny Diplomas, 30 
COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 495, 496 (1999) (noting that student accountability programs rely on 
“high-stakes testing,” with test results used to determine important educational decisions, grade 
promotion, and diploma denial).  
 2. Krista Kafer, Education Reform: Half a Loaf, WASH. TIMES, Jan. 15, 2002, at A12. For 
example, in 1974, immediately after signing a highly touted bipartisan education reform bill, President 
Gerald Ford announced, “Today, and for generations to come, America will benefit from this law, 
which expresses our national commitment to quality education for all children.” Id. In 1978, President 
Carter echoed the sentiment, stating that with the new education bill he had signed, “we have together 
taken an historic step in the evolution of the federal role in education.” Id. Similarly, Massachusetts 
Democrat Edward Kennedy announced that the education reform package of 1994 was “the most 
important reauthorization in this legislation’s history.” Id. Eight years later, President George W. Bush 
hailed the No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, supra note 1, as “the most important piece of legislation 
most of us will ever work on.” Kafer, supra, at A12. Massive expenditures have accompanied these 
“lofty statements.” See Eric A. Hanushek & Margaret E. Raymond, The Confusing World of 
Educational Accountability, 54 NAT’L TAX J. 365, 367 (2001) (stating that “real spending per student 
has more than tripled between 1960 and 1995”). 
 3. Kafer, supra note 2. Despite the long-running history of efforts to improve education, more 
than half of all poor children still score below “basic” on the National Assessment of Education 
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have prompted more than forty state governments to require at least some of 
their teachers to pass a standardized test as a condition of their employment.4 
States use teacher tests to measure an individual’s basic skills, general 
knowledge, content knowledge, and knowledge of teaching strategies.5 The 
tests are designed to determine which teachers “are at least minimally 
competent in the areas assessed.”6 
The states’ emphasis on standardized testing has resulted in the exclusion 
of a disproportionate number of minority applicants from the teacher supply.7 
The authors of a study commissioned by the United States Department of 
Education found that minority candidates had lower passing rates than the 
non-minority candidates on all of the state teacher tests they reviewed.8  
Progress reading and math tests. Id. See also Lord, supra note 1, at 28 (noting that even though federal 
spending on education has exceeded $200 billion since 1965, two-thirds of all fourth graders still read 
at or below the basic level, while achievement gaps between white and minority pupils have begun to 
widen in some areas); Hanushek & Raymond, supra note 2, at 366-67 (analyzing student scores on 
National Assessment of Educational Progress from 1960 to 1995, finding slight improvements in 
reading and math scores but noticeable declines in science and writing and noting that the United 
States has placed at or below the middle of the international distribution on international tests since 
they began in the 1960s); Louis V. Gerstner Jr., Find, Support Best Teachers, USA TODAY, Jan. 23, 
2003, at 23A (“In 1989, at an education summit headed by the first President Bush and attended by all 
50 governors, we set a national goal of leading the world in math and science. Ten years later, we 
weren’t even in the middle of the pack. High-minded aspirations do not equal action.”). States and 
schools are struggling to meet the dozens of new requirements imposed by the No Child Left Behind 
Act, the latest effort by the federal government to reform and improve the education system in the 
United States. See Greg Toppo, States Strain to Keep Up With ‘No Child Left Behind,’ USA TODAY, 
Jan. 29, 2003, at 1A; Mary Leonard, Schools Reported Lagging New Law, THE BOSTON GLOBE, Jan. 
4, 2003, at A3. 
 4. See KAREN J. MITCHELL ET AL., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, TESTING TEACHER 
CANDIDATES: THE ROLE OF LICENSURE TESTS IN IMPROVING TEACHER QUALITY 1 (2001) (noting 
that forty-two states require teacher candidates to pass one or more tests to earn a license); Susan L. 
Melnick & Diana Pullin, Can You Take Dictation? Prescribing Teacher Quality Through Testing, 51 
J. TCHR. EDUC. 262, 263 (2000) (stating that more than forty states now use teacher tests rather than 
entitlement for certification); see also Vance, supra note 1, at 1077-78 (stating that the predominant 
manifestation of the accountability movement is testing teachers’ competency). 
 5. MITCHELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 3.  
 6. Id. There is substantial variation among the states in their implementation of teacher testing 
requirements. Id. “Each of the 42 states that require tests uses a different combination of them, uses 
them at different points in a candidate’s education, and sets its own passing scores.” Id. 
 7. See Rona F. Flippo & Michael P. Riccards, Initial Teacher Certification Testing in 
Massachusetts: A Case of the Tail Wagging the Dog, 82 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 34, 36 (2000) (noting that 
several studies have concluded that teacher testing has an adverse effect on the number of prospective 
non-white teachers, and that educators “fear that too many minorities are being shut out of classrooms 
because of standardized testing.”). See also infra Part II.B.1. (discussing how standardized testing has 
a disparate impact on minority populations).  
 8. See MITCHELL ET AL., supra note 4, at 4; see also Vance, supra note 1, at 1094 & n.97 
(discussing the disproportionate impact on minorities in several states). Standardized testing of 
students has also had a disproportionate impact on minority populations. See Elul, supra note 1, at 496 
(“Opponents charge that these programs have a disproportionate impact on minority students and 
effectively deny them the right to an adequate education.”).  While student testing raises similar 
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Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 19649 should provide a remedy for 
minority educators who are denied opportunities due to a state’s use of 
standardized competency testing as a condition of employment.10 Title VII 
states that it is unlawful for any employer to discriminate against an 
individual because of his or her race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.11 
The statute prohibits the use of employment tests that have a disparate impact 
on minorities, unless the tests have a manifest relationship to the job in 
question and no less discriminatory alternatives are available.12 Title VII 
applies to state and local government employers.13  
Minority educators encounter unique obstacles to Title VII relief when a 
school district imposes testing requirements pursuant to state mandates.14 
Courts consider the local school district, not the state, the teacher’s employer 
because the district hires and fires the teacher, and conducts her daily 
supervision.15 Federal courts have generally held that an employer can be 
liable under Title VII if it interferes with an individual’s employment with 
another employer;16 however, federal courts have also held that Title VII 
concerns, this Note will concentrate on issues raised by teacher testing programs. See id. for a general 
discussion of the disparate impact created by student testing, and possible remedies for aggrieved 
plaintiffs. 
 9. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (2000). 
 10. See discussion infra Parts II.A, B. 
 11. The Statute states:  
(a) Employer practices 
 It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer— 
 (1) to fail or refuse to hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against 
any individual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, 
because of such individual’s race, color, religion, sex or national origin[.]  
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000). 
 12. Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 446-47 (1982) (summarizing and quoting Griggs v. Duke 
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 431-32 (1971)). See also 42 U.S.C. §2000e-2(k) (2000); infra Part II.A. Title 
VII permits employers to rely on the results of an ability test “provided such test, its administration or 
action upon the results is not designed, intended, or used to discriminate because of race, color, 
religion, sex or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(h) (2000).  
 13. Congress specifically extended Title VII’s coverage to state and local government employers 
in 1972. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, § 2(a)-(b), 86 Stat. 103, 
103 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (2000)). The Eleventh Amendment is thus no bar to 
suits under Title VII. Id. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (stating Eleventh 
Amendment does not bar suits under Title VII); see also Hearne v. Bd. of Educ. of Chicago, 185 F.3d 
770, 777 (7th Cir. 1999) (noting the State defendants conceded that the Eleventh Amendment did not 
bar the plaintiffs’ Title VII suit).  
 14. See infra Part II.C. 
 15. See Fields v. Hallsville Indep. Sch. Dist., 906 F.2d 1017, 1020 (5th Cir. 1990) (holding that 
the state could not be considered an employer because it did not play any role in the general hiring or 
firing of teachers, or in their daily supervision); EEOC v. Illinois, 69 F.3d 167, 171 (7th Cir. 1995) 
(holding that the state could not be considered an employer of teachers because it did not control hiring 
and firing). See also infra Parts II.C.1, 2.  
 16. See Gomez v. Alexian Bros. Hosp., 698 F.2d 1019, 1021 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding that Title 
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does not apply to state licensing requirements for certain professionals, such 
as dentists and veterinarians.17 Thus, states can argue that Title VII does not 
apply to teacher licensing, because their use of the tests as a licensing 
requirement for prospective teachers constitutes an exercise of the states’ 
police power to protect the public.18  
The federal circuit courts have split on the issue of whether a state can be 
liable under Title VII when it mandates that schools hire only teachers who 
pass prescribed competency tests.19 The Fifth Circuit Court of Appeals has 
held that a state’s role in administering teacher tests creates no more than a 
licensing relationship, thereby insulating the state from liability.20 The 
Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals has indicated that states cannot be liable 
because they do not possess hiring and firing powers.21 Conversely, the Ninth 
Circuit Court of Appeals has held that a state can be liable under these 
circumstances.22 
This circuit split creates uncertainty for applicants, school districts, and 
states, even as teacher testing becomes increasingly pervasive.23 Congress 
adopted Title VII to prevent all employment discrimination, including 
discrimination by state and local governments.24 States do not have any 
incentive to reduce the discriminatory impact of their tests if they cannot be 
liable under Title VII.25 Moreover, if minority applicants can only sue their 
direct employers, i.e., the school districts, they may be left without a Title VII 
remedy.26 Courts may be unwilling to impose liability on school districts that 
VII language that it “shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer...[to] otherwise . . . 
discriminate against any individual” encompasses situations in which a “defendant subject to Title VII 
interferes with an individual’s employment opportunities with another employer”); Luchter v. 
Musicians Union Local 47, 633 F.2d 880, 883 n.3 (9th Cir. 1980) (noting that a connection with 
employment need not necessarily be direct for Title VII to apply, and the connection may include 
interference); Sibley Mem’l Hosp. v. Wilson, 488 F.2d 1338, 1341 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (stating that 
holding employers liable for interference with employment relationships is necessary to effectuate 
Congressional intent). See also infra Part II.B.3. 
 17. See Haddock v. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 777 F.2d 462, 463-64 (9th Cir. 1985) (holding that 
State Board of Dental Examiners was not subject to Title VII liability, reasoning that Title VII was not 
intended to apply to state licensing agencies or those licensed by them).  
 18. See infra Parts II.B.4, II.C.1.  
 19. See infra notes 20-22 and accompanying text. See also infra Part II.C. 
 20. Fields, 906 F.2d, at 1020. See also infra Part II.C.1. 
 21. EEOC v. Illinois, 69 F.3d at 171. See also infra Part II.C.2. 
 22. Ass’n of Mexican-Am. Educators v. California, 231 F.3d 572, 584 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 
See also infra Part II.C.3. 
 23. See infra Part III.  
 24. See infra Part II.B.4. 
 25. See infra notes 104, 124-25 and accompanying text (discussing the need to hold states 
accountable for discriminatory conduct). 
 26. See infra notes 103-04, 121-23 and accompanying text. 
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are merely complying with state mandates.27 If courts are willing to find 
school districts liable, the districts will have to choose between potentially 
violating Title VII or defying state mandates.28 Finally, the states, which have 
imposed testing requirements in response to pressures from the public and 
the federal government, have no guidance in determining how they can 
ensure teacher quality without risking Title VII liability.29 
Part I of this Note examines the standards developed by the courts in 
applying Title VII to employment testing, the potential application of these 
standards to teacher testing, and the case law regarding whether states who 
implement or enforce teacher testing requirements are subject to Title VII 
liability. Part II analyzes the implications of the controversies that have 
developed in this area of the law. Part III proposes a federal statute to resolve 
the split among the circuit courts. This statute will ensure that (1) aggrieved 
plaintiffs possess a remedy whenever a state’s teacher testing program 
violates Title VII, (2) local school districts are insulated from Title VII 
liability if they act pursuant to state mandates, and (3) state governments are 
provided with opportunities to develop examinations that will be compliant 
with Title VII. 
 27. Id.; but see infra note 28. 
 28. School districts may be held liable under Title VII even if they do nothing more than comply 
with state mandates. See Richardson v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 935 F.2d 1240, 1246-47 (11th Cir. 
1991) (noting that even if the county school board’s decision not to hire an applicant who failed a 
teacher certification test had been required by state statute, the board would still lack a Title VII 
defense, because federal law pre-empts state law) (citing Int’l Union v. Johnson Controls, 499 U.S. 
187, 209 (1991)). See also Gulino v. Bd. of Educ., 236 F. Supp. 2d 314, 335 (S.D.N.Y. 2002), rev’d on 
other grounds, 2002 WL 31887733 (S.D.N.Y. 2002) (rejecting city school board’s defense that it was 
merely following state mandates, stating “[i]t is well-settled that Title VII preempts any state laws in 
conflict with it.”). However, the school district may still elect to risk liability under Title VII to avoid 
violating state mandates. See United States v. New York State Dep’t of Motor Vehicles, 82 F. Supp. 
2d 42, 49 (E.D.N.Y. 2000) (stating that even though federal anti-discrimination laws take precedence 
over state laws or regulations, a district may prefer to avoid challenging the coercive power of the 
state, even if it might ultimately prevail). A school district may be unwilling to engage in costly 
litigation to obtain an employee’s services. Id. Thus, even an unlawful state mandate could still 
interfere with the district’s employment decisions. Id.  
 29. Teacher testing has led to frequent litigation. See EUGENE MCQUILLIN 16B, THE LAW OF 
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 46.12 (3d ed. Supp. 2002); see also Patricia M. Lines, Teacher 
Competency Testing: A Review of Legal Considerations, in 23 WEST’S EDUC. LAW REP. 811, 818-19 
(1985) (noting that a number of states have been sued because of their teaching testing programs, with 
varying results); infra note 115 and accompanying text. The State of Alabama was embroiled in 
litigation regarding its teacher testing program from 1981 through 2000. See Allen v. Alabama State 
Bd. of Educ., 816 F.2d 575 (11th Cir. 1987) (describing the history of the litigation to that point); see 
also Allen v. Alabama State Bd. of Educ., 216 F.3d 1263 (11th Cir. 2000) (the latest ruling in this 
litigation).  
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II. HISTORY 
A. Title VII and Employment Testing 
Congress adopted Title VII to eliminate employment practices, including 
testing, that have discriminatory impacts.30 However, Title VII allows 
employers to use tests that are not discriminatory.31 The United States 
Supreme Court established the basic scheme for employment testing 
litigation in Griggs v. Duke Power Co.32 The plaintiff(s) must first prove that 
the tests in question have a significantly discriminatory impact.33 The burden 
of proof then shifts to the employer to show that the tests have a manifest 
relationship to the employment in question.34 The plaintiff(s) may still 
 30. See Connecticut v. Teal, 457 U.S. 440, 448 (1982) (“The statute speaks, not in terms of jobs 
and promotions, but in terms of limitations and classifications that would deprive any individual of 
employment opportunities.”); Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 429-30 (1971) (“The objective 
of Congress in the enactment of Title VII is plain from the language of the statute. It was to achieve 
equality of employment opportunities and remove barriers that have operated in the past to favor an 
identifiable group of white employees over other employees.”). Congress identified employment 
testing as a practice that could promote discrimination. See id. at 430 (“Under the Act, practices, 
procedures, or tests neutral on their face, and even neutral in terms of intent, cannot be maintained if 
they operate to ‘freeze’ the status quo of prior discriminatory employment practices.”); see also id. at 
431 (“Congress has now provided that tests or criteria for employment or promotion may not provide 
equality of opportunity merely in the sense of the fabled offer of milk to the stork and the fox . . . The 
Act proscribes not only overt discrimination but also practices that are fair in form, but discriminatory 
in operation”); see also id. at 433 (“The facts . . . demonstrate the inadequacy of broad and general 
testing devices . . . Diplomas and tests are useful servants, but Congress has mandated the 
commonsense proposition that they are not to become masters of reality.”); see also Anna S. Rominger 
& Pamela Sandoval, Employee Testing: Reconciling the Twin Goals of Productivity and Fairness, 10 
DEPAUL BUS. L.J. 299, 306 (1998) (noting that Congress was aware of employers’ discriminatory use 
of employment tests to deprive minorities of employment opportunities and responded by passing Title 
VII to establish fair employment policy).  
 31. See 42 U.S.C. §2000 e-2(h) (2000): 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this subchapter, it shall not be an unlawful employment 
practice for an employer . . . to give and to act upon the results of any professionally developed 
ability test provided that such test, its administration or action upon the results is not designed, 
intended, or used to discriminate because of race, color, religion, sex or national origin.  
Id. 
 32. 401 U.S. at 424-36. 
 33. Teal, 457 U.S. at 446  (summarizing Griggs, 401 U.S. at 431). See also Bew v. City of 
Chicago, 979 F. Supp. 693, 695 (N.D. Ill. 1997) (stating that to establish a prima facie case of 
disparate impact, the plaintiff must show “that the tests in question select applicants for hire or 
promotion in a racial pattern significantly different from that of the pool of applicants”) (quoting 
Albemarle Paper Co. v. Moody, 422 U.S. 405, 425 (1975)). 
 34. Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432. In Griggs, the defendant-company imposed a requirement that 
employees seeking to work in its higher-paying departments had to either possess a high school 
diploma or register a satisfactory score on two professionally prepared aptitude tests. Id. at 427-28. 
The requirements had a disparate impact on the African American workers. Id. at 430. The Court held 
that neither requirement bore a demonstrable relationship to successful performance of the job. Id. at 
431. The Court noted that the company appeared to lack discriminatory intent, but held that “Congress 
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prevail, even if the tests are shown to be “job related,” by showing that other, 
less discriminatory tests could advance the employer’s interests.35 The Civil 
Rights Act of 1991 codified the Griggs framework.36  
directed the thrust of the Act to the consequences of employment practices, not simply the 
motivation,” and that “Congress has placed on the employer the burden of showing that any given 
requirement must have a manifest relationship to the employment in question.” Id. at 432. See also 
Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425 (“Title VII forbids the use of employment tests that are discriminatory in 
effect unless the employer meets ‘the burden of showing that any given requirement [has] . . . a 
manifest relationship to the employment in question’”) (quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432). 
 35. Albemarle, 422 U.S. at 425 (summarizing and quoting Griggs, 401 U.S. at 432). The 
complainant may prevail by showing that “other tests or selection devices, without a similarly 
undesirable racial effect, would serve the employer’s legitimate interest in ‘efficient and trustworthy 
workmanship.’” Id. at 425 (quoting McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 793, 801 (1973)). 
 36. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(k) (2000) (stating that to prove an unlawful employment practice 
based on disparate impact, the complaining party must demonstrate the disparate impact, and the 
respondent must fail to demonstrate that the challenged practice is “job related for the position in 
question and consistent with business necessity”); see also Civil Rights Act of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-
166, § 3(2), 105 Stat. 1071 (1991) (stating that one of the purposes of the statute was to codify the 
concepts of “business necessity” and “job related” enunciated by the Supreme Court in Griggs and 
“other Supreme Court decisions prior to Wards Cove Packing Co. v. Antonio.”). In Wards Cove 
Packing Co. v. Atonio, 490 U.S. 642 (1989), the United States Supreme Court held that the burden of 
persuasion remained with plaintiff. Id. at 659. The Court also held there was no requirement that the 
challenged practice be “essential” or “indispensable” to the employer’s business. Id. Congress placed 
the burden of demonstrating business justification squarely back onto the defendant with the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991. Civil Rights Act § 2(2). Congress stated that “the decision of the Supreme Court 
in Wards Cove . . . has weakened the scope and effectiveness of Federal civil rights protections.” Id.    
 Congress further found that the legislation was “necessary to provide additional protections 
against unlawful discrimination in employment.” Id. at § 2(3). See also Andrew C. Spiropoulos, 
Defining the Business Necessity Defense to the Disparate Impact Cause of Action: Finding the Golden 
Mean, 74 N.C. L. Rev. 1479, 1514 (1996): 
Perhaps the most powerful argument in favor of finding that the Act establishes a strict necessity 
standard is the Act’s clear rejection of Wards Cove. The entire motivation for the introduction and 
passage of the Act was the majority of Congress’s disapproval of the rules laid down in Wards 
Cove and the other Supreme Court decisions overturned or modified by the Act.  
Id. The House Education and Labor Committee argued that the consensus among experts was that 
Griggs triggered a dramatic improvement in the quality and reliability of employee selection criteria, 
benefiting employers subject to its standards. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I) (1991), reprinted in 1991 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 563-64. According to the House Committee, Griggs prompted employers “to 
forsake reliance on unsubstantiated tests and other arbitrary job requirements that excluded large 
numbers of well-qualified individuals from employment or promotion.” Id. at 563.  
 The Committee noted that it considered and rejected an amendment that would have presumed 
“business necessity” when an employer relied on academic achievements. Id. at 643. The Judiciary 
Committee noted that Congress expressly rejected an amendment to insulate professionally developed 
ability tests when Title VII was first enacted “because it would have exempted employers from an 
obligation to demonstrate that a disputed test in fact led to significantly enhanced job performance.” 
H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(II) (1991), reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, 704. The Education and Labor 
Committee added that its “clear intent” was that an employer actually demonstrate the relationship 
between a challenged practice and successful job performance.  H.R. Rep. No. 102-40(I) at 576-77. 
The Committee added that “presumptions or preconceptions about the usefulness of an employment 
practice are insufficient to establish business necessity.” Id.at 576. 
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B. Issues Affecting Application of Title VII to Teacher Testing 
1. The Disparate Impact of Teacher Testing on Minorities 
Minority teaching candidates tend to have significantly lower passing 
rates than non-minority candidates on state teacher tests, resulting in the 
exclusion of a disproportionate number of prospective minority teachers from 
the classroom.37 Some analysts contend that standardized testing tends to 
value the particular personality traits of the majority culture, to the detriment 
of minority populations, and merely reflects the candidates’ competencies in 
test-taking.38  
2. The Tests’ Relation to the Employment in Question 
Education reformers contend that improving the quality of instruction in 
the classroom is the solution to students’ underachievement.39 Supporters of 
 37. See Jerry R. Parkinson, The Use of Competency Testing in the Evaluation of Public School 
Teachers, 39 U. KAN. L. REV. 845, 878-80 (1991) (describing a “litany of cases . . . in which testing 
programs have had a disproportionate impact on minorities”); Linda L. Strassle, Note, Minimum 
Competency Testing of Teachers for Certification: Due Process, Equal Protection and Title VII 
Implications, 70 CORNELL L. REV. 494, 495 n.5 (1985) (reviewing a number of sources describing 
how teacher competency requirements have resulted in the disproportionate disqualification of 
minorities); Flippo & Riccards, supra note 7, at 36 (noting that minorities in several states throughout 
the United States have not, on average, performed as well as whites on teacher certification tests); see 
also supra notes 7-8 and accompanying text.  
 38. See Rominger & Sandoval, supra note 30, at 343-44 (citing criticism that standardized testing 
programs “value particular personality traits according to the majority culture’s view of those abilities, 
then allocate opportunities and resources on the basis of this valuation,” while in reality reflecting 
nothing more than competencies in test-taking); see also Elul, supra note 1, at 516-517 (“Test bias is 
often subtle and not facially apparent. Bias may result from many factors, such as a failure to 
standardize tests across various cultural groups or from testmakers’ subconscious prejudices rather 
than from an intent to alter the test content to the detriment of certain groups.”). 
 39. See Lynn Olson, Quality Counts Reveals National ‘Teacher Gap,’ EDUC. WEEK, Jan. 8, 
2003, at http://www.edweek.org/ew/ew_printstory.cfm?slug=16qc.h22: 
“Studies show that when it comes to student achievement, effective teachers are more important 
than any other school ingredient,” said Virginia B. Edwards, the editor of Quality Counts 2003 
and of Education Week. “If states hope to close the achievement gap between minority and non-
minority students and those from rich and poor families, they must first close the gap in access to 
skilled teachers.” 
Id. See also Rosetta Marantz Cohen, Schools Our Teachers Deserve: A Proposal for Teacher-Centered 
Reform, 83 PHI DELTA KAPPAN 532, 532 (2002) (contending that the “whole failed history of modern 
education reform” has “paid hardly any attention to the work of the teacher, the one critical player in 
the school who makes the biggest difference.”); Marilyn Cochran-Smith, Desperately Seeking 
Solutions, 52 J. TCHR. EDUC. 347, 347 (2001) (noting the “unprecedented intensity of current public 
attention” to teacher education); Robert Holland, How to Build a Better Teacher, POL’Y REV., Apr. & 
May, 2001, at 37 (describing Tennessee statistician William Sanders’ findings that teacher 
effectiveness is far more important to educational outcomes than class size, ethnicity, location, or 
poverty ); Melnick & Pullin, supra note 4, at 263 (stating that teacher qualifications have become a 
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teacher testing argue that testing ensures the competence and professional 
reputation of teachers.40 The No Child Left Behind Act,41 the federal 
education legislation passed in 2002, requires schools to ensure that all of 
their teachers are “highly qualified,” a phrase that can (and sometimes must) 
include passage of a “rigorous state test.” 42  
Critics contend that current teacher tests focus exclusively on the 
teacher’s knowledge of content or teaching strategies and ignore other critical 
aspects of teacher competency, such as motivating and engaging students of 
varied backgrounds, serving as good role models, and engaging parents and 
the community.43 Thus, critics allege, teacher tests produce erroneous 
national issue). 
 40. See Sandra Feldman, American Federation of Teachers, Building a Profession, (June 2000), 
at http://www.aft.org/stand/previous/2000/0600.html (contending that requiring all new teachers to 
pass high-level professional exams would “strengthen the professional component of teaching and 
bring teaching more in line with other professions like medicine or law.”); William S. Dolan, The 
Twenty Thousand Dollar Question—What is a Preposition? Teacher Competency Testing and the 
Increasing Risk of Failure, 27 J.L. & EDUC. 667, 668 (1998) (“Competency testing will not ensure 
competent educators. An understanding of subject matter is but one of many requisite skills. However, 
testing will make certain that candidates have a baseline knowledge that they may then rely upon in 
pursuit of educational excellence.”); Jane G. Noble, Note, Teacher Termination and Competency 
Testing, 63 TEX. L. REV. 933, 937-41 (1985) (advocating the extension of competency testing, and 
addressing several common objections to teacher testing). Testing supporters argue that the public will 
not want individuals to teach their children if the candidates cannot meet certain minimum knowledge 
and skills standards , irrespective of how good they are at other teaching skills. S.E. Phillips, Extending 
Teacher Licensure Testing: Have the Courts Applied the Wrong Validity Standard?, 8 T.M. COOLEY 
L. REV. 513, 546-47 (1991). Supporters argue that if states lower standards to allow more 
“incompetent” minority teachers in the classroom, minority students will be unable to “learn the basic 
skills necessary for a technological world.” Id. at 548-49. 
 41. No Child Left Behind Act of 2001, Pub. L. No. 107-110, 115 Stat. 1425 (2002). 
 42. The law requires that local education agencies ensure that all teachers hired after January 8, 
2002 be “highly qualified.”Id. at  § 6319(a)(1) (2002). All teachers teaching in core academic subjects 
must be “highly qualified” by the end of the 2005-2006 school year. Id. at § 6319(a)(2). The term 
“highly qualified” when used with respect to an elementary school teacher who is new to the 
profession means that the teacher “holds at least a bachelor’s degree” and “has demonstrated, by 
passing a rigorous State test, subject knowledge and teaching skills in reading, writing, mathematics, 
and other areas of the basic elementary school curriculum.” 20 U.S.C.S. § 7801 (23)(B)(i) (2002). The 
term “highly qualified” with respect to all other teachers means that the teacher has either passed a 
rigorous State test or otherwise demonstrated competence in the relevant academic subjects. 20 U.S.C. 
§ 7801 (23)(C).  
 43. See MITCHELL, supra note 4, at 3 (citing these and other skills teachers need, noting that 
“[t]here is no single agreed-upon definition of what competencies a beginning teacher should have.”); 
id. at 4 (“Because a teacher’s work is complex, even a set of well-designed tests cannot measure all of 
the prerequisites of competent beginning teaching. Current paper-and-pencil tests provide only some 
of the information needed to evaluate the competencies of teacher candidates.”); id. at 7 (stating that 
“[l]ittle research has been conducted on the extent to which scores on current teacher licensure tests 
relate to other measures of beginning teacher competence. Much of the research that has been 
conducted suffers from methodological problems that interfere with making strong conclusions about 
the results.”). See also Arthur E. Wise & Jane A. Leibbrand, Standards in the New Millennium: Where 
We Are, Where We’re Headed, 52 J. TCHR. EDUC. 244, 251 (2001) (stating that “commonly used 
teacher licensure assessments examine only part of the knowledge and skills that new teachers should 
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information regarding who is truly competent.44  
3. The Application of Title VII Beyond Direct Employers 
Because teachers are hired and fired by their local school districts, federal 
courts do not consider the state governments who impose teacher testing 
requirements their direct employers.45 However, the District of Columbia 
Circuit Court of Appeals, in Sibley Memorial Hospital v. Wilson, ruled that a 
direct employment relationship is not required for an entity to be liable under 
Title VII.46 The court ruled that a male plaintiff who alleged that supervisory 
nurses at the defendant hospital used their authority to prevent him from 
working as a private duty nurse for female patients had stated a cause of 
action under Title VII.47  
The D.C. Circuit held that Title VII could be extended to defendants who 
were not the direct employers of the plaintiffs, if the defendants controlled 
the plaintiffs’ access to employment and denied such access on the basis of 
acquire.”); Lines, supra note 29, at 811 (1985) (noting that teacher tests “fail to measure important 
characteristics that make for an effective teacher—such as compassion, love of children, energy, 
wisdom, or dedication.”).  
 44. See Marilyn Cochran-Smith, Reporting on Teacher Quality: The Politics of Politics, 53 J. 
TCHR. EDUC. 379, 381 (2002) (noting that a teacher who passes a state teacher test may nevertheless 
be “unqualified” if he or she does not have classroom experience, courses in pedagogy, knowledge of 
cultural differences, or knowledge of human development); see also Rominger & Sandoval, supra note 
30, at 342-44 (arguing that standardized testing performance reflects nothing more than competencies 
in test-taking); see also id. at 342 (stating that employment tests create false positives, which overrate 
the potential of some workers, and false negatives, which underrate the potential of other workers); 
Catherine Luna et al., Defining Literacy: Lessons from High-Stakes Teacher Testing, 51 J. TCHR. 
EDUC. 276, 276 (2000) (stating that teacher tests often “run counter to educators’ most deeply held 
beliefs about literacy, learning, and teaching”); Flippo & Riccards, supra note 7, at 35-36 (arguing that 
teacher tests do not measure the intangibles of a good teacher, but instead focus on minimum skills 
rather than the higher-order qualities of excellent teachers; there is little evidence of a correlation 
between test performance and job performance; and that the tests undesirably affect instruction in 
teacher education programs). 
 45. See supra note 15. See also Part I.C.2. 
 46. 488 F.2d 1338 (D.C. Cir. 1973). 
 47. Id. at 1342. The plaintiff was considered the employee of the patients. Id. at 1339. Patients 
who requested the services of private duty nurses were matched with the nurses through a registry and 
referral system. Id. If the patients rejected the nurses who were selected for them, they were still 
obligated to pay those nurses for a full day’s work. Id. This system was designed to insure that the 
nurses would not be “victimized by invidious discrimination.” Id. The plaintiff alleged that on two 
occasions, supervisory nurses at the defendant hospital had rejected his services because he was male 
and the requesting patients were female, preventing him from receiving compensation. Id. at 1339-40. 
The plaintiff further alleged that over a thirty-four-year period every patient whom he attended at the 
defendant hospital was male, despite the fact that female nurses routinely served both male and female 
clients. Id. at 1340.  
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race, color, religion, sex, or national origin. 48 The court stated that allowing 
an employer to exploit circumstances “peculiarly affording it the capability 
of discriminatorily interfering with an individual’s employment opportunities 
with another employer” when it could not do so directly would “condone 
continued use of the very criteria for employment that Congress has 
prohibited.”49 The D.C. Circuit noted that under Title VII, it is unlawful for 
an employer “to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or 
otherwise to discriminate against any individual.”50 The court added that 
Title VII explicitly included parties not involved in direct employment 
relationships, such as employment agencies and labor organizations.51 Courts 
in other circuits have endorsed Sibley’s holding.52  
4. Title VII’s Applicability to Teachers Employed by State and Local 
Governments 
Congress eliminated the immunity of state and local governments from 
Title VII through legislation passed in 1972.53 The committee report 
accompanying the legislation stated that discriminatory tactics, including 
invalid selection techniques, were more pervasive in state and local 
 48. Id. at 1341. The D.C. Circuit noted that Congress created Title VII to provide access to the 
job market for both men and women. Id. (quoting Diaz v. Pan Am. World Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 
386 (5th Cir. 1971)). The court also noted that Congress had prohibited labor organizations, 
employment agencies, and employers from foreclosing, on discriminatory grounds, access by any 
individual to available employment opportunities. Id. at 1341. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)). The court noted that the Civil Rights Act’s 
provisions for the filing of complaints with the EEOC did not use the term “employee,” but rather the 
“person aggrieved,” which would include individuals who did not stand in a direct employment 
relationship with an employer. Id. 
 51. Id. at 1342. The court acknowledged, however, that certain Title VII remedies could only be 
provided where there was a direct employment relationship (e.g., reinstatement, hiring). Id. 
 52. See Bender v. Suburban Hosp., Inc., 159 F.3d 186, 188 (4th Cir. 1998) (“We also need not 
resolve . . . whether Title VII allows indirect liability for an employer’s interference with an 
individual’s employment with third parties. Every Court of Appeals to consider this issue has followed 
the lead of the District of Columbia Circuit in allowing such a claim.”); Christopher v. Stouder Mem’l 
Hosp., 936 F.2d 870, 875 (6th Cir. 1991) (agreeing with Sibley and noting that a private scrub nurse 
could not pursue employment opportunities if the defendant denied her privileges, even though the 
defendant did not pay the nurse’s salary, stating that the nurse’s lack of status as a direct employee or 
independent contractor did not negate the fact that the defendant had exclusive control over the nurse’s 
ability to practice); Zaklama v. Mt. Sinai Med. Ctr., 842 F.2d 291, 294 (11th Cir. 1988) (“It is clear 
from the language of the statute that Congress intended that the rights and obligations it created under 
Title VII would extend beyond the immediate employer-employee relationship.”); Pardazi v. Cullman 
Med. Ctr., 838 F.2d 1155, 1156 (11th Cir. 1988) (agreeing with Sibley and noting that “[s]everal courts 
have recognized that Title VII’s protection does extend to a claim that a defendant has interfered with 
an individual’s employment relationship with a third party.”). See also infra note 117. 
 
 53.  Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-261, §2, 86 Stat. 103, 103 
(1972).  
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governments than in the private sector.54 Congress also expanded Title VII’s 
coverage to include teachers and other educational institution employees with 
the 1972 legislation.55 The committee report argued that to permit 
discrimination in educational institutions, “where the Nation’s youth are 
exposed to a multitude of ideas that will strongly influence their future 
development . . . would, more than in any other area, tend to promote 
misconceptions leading to future patterns of discrimination.”56  
However, courts have routinely held that Title VII does not apply to state 
governments that establish licensing requirements for particular 
professions.57 The Third Circuit Court of Appeals, in George v. New Jersey 
Board of Veterinary Medical Examiners,58 held that Title VII does not apply 
to the licensing functions of a public agency exercised under the police 
powers of a state.59 The court stated that there was “nothing even remotely 
resembling an employer-employee relationship” between the plaintiff and a 
state board regulating admission to the practice of veterinary medicine.60 The 
court distinguished Sibley, noting that in Sibley, the defendant hospital had a 
close relationship to the employment by its patients of private duty nurses.61 
The court further noted that in Sibley, the exercise of the police power was 
not involved; in George, the defendant was exercising its police power to 
protect the public from unqualified veterinary service.62 Other circuit courts 
have endorsed this “licensing exception” to Title VII.63 
 54. The House Report cited reports of “widespread perpetuation of past discriminatory practices” 
by public employers through “segregated job ladders, invalid selection techniques, and stereotyped 
misconceptions by supervisors regarding minority group capabilities.” H.R. REP. NO. 92-238 (1971), 
reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2152 (emphasis added). 
 55. Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972 §3 (removing educational institution employees 
from the list of Title VII exemptions).  
 56. H.R. REP. NO. 92-238 (1972), reprinted in U.S.C.C.A.N. 2137, 2155. The House Education 
and Labor Committee stated that the “problem of employment discrimination is particularly acute and 
has the most deleterious effect in these governmental activities which are most visible to the minority 
communities (notably education, law enforcement, and the administration of justice) . . . ” Id. at 2153. 
The Committee also made the following observation: 
The committee feels that discrimination in educational institutions is especially critical. The 
committee can not imagine a more sensitive area than educational institutions where the Nation’s 
youth are exposed to a multitude of ideas that will strongly influence their future development.  
Id. at 2155. 
 57. See infra notes 58-63. 
 58. 794 F.2d 113 (3d Cir. 1986). 
 59. Id. at 114. 
 60. Id. The plaintiff asserted that the board denied his application because of his national origin. 
Id. at 114.  
 61. Id. 
 62. Id. at 114-115. 
 63. The Ninth Circuit has also held that Title VII does not apply to licensing activities. In 
Haddock v. Bd. of Dental Exam’rs, 777 F.2d 462 (9th Cir. 1985), the plaintiff, a black male, failed to 
 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol81/iss2/11
p561 Blotevogel book pages.doc10/27/03   12:55 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
2003] TESTING TITLE VII’s PATIENCE? 573 
 
 
 
 
 
C. Title VII and Teacher Testing 
Prior to 1990, it was not clear whether states that required school districts 
to make passage of teacher tests a prerequisite to employment could be liable 
under Title VII. One line of cases suggested that any employer who 
unlawfully interfered with an individual’s employment relationships could be 
liable under Title VII.64 However, a separate line of cases held that a state 
could not be liable under Title VII if it was exercising its police powers to 
control the entry of individuals into certain occupations.65 The Fifth, Seventh, 
and Ninth Circuits have responded to this quandary with varying approaches. 
1. Fifth Circuit: The State Cannot be Liable Because It Is Engaged in 
a Licensing Activity 
The Fifth Circuit has ruled that states and state agencies are not liable 
under Title VII for teacher testing. In Fields v. Hallsville Independent School 
District,66 a school district terminated the plaintiffs from their teaching 
positions after they failed to pass a certification examination.67 The teachers 
filed suit against the State of Texas and certain officials and agencies of the 
State.68 The teachers claimed that the state actors violated Title VII by 
choosing a cut-off score “that worked to discriminate against them based on 
age and/or race.”69  
achieve a passing score on a dental licensing examination, and his application for a license to practice 
dentistry was denied by the defendant Board. Id. at 463. The plaintiff alleged that the Board 
“intentionally lowered his dental examination scores and refused to issue him a license” because he 
was African-American. Id. The Ninth Circuit held that Title VII was not intended to apply to the 
Board’s licensing activity. Id. at 464. The court noted that the Board did not pay the wages nor engage 
the services of the examinees. Id. The court argued that Congress intended to benefit only those 
actually employed by state governments or their subdivisions when it removed the exemption for state 
governments and their subdivisions from Title VII in 1972. Id.  
 64. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 65. See supra Part II.B.4. 
 66. 906 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1990). 
 67. Id. at 1018. Both of the plaintiffs were black women, fifty-nine years old or older, each with 
at least eleven years of experience with their school district. Id. The test involved was the Texas 
Examination for Current Administrators and Teachers (TECAT). Id. 
 68. Id. The teachers sued the Texas Education Agency, Texas Commissioner of Education, Texas 
State Board of Education and State of Texas. Id. The teachers also claimed that their school district 
“discriminated against them, subsequent to their termination, by failing or refusing to consider them 
for non-certified positions that became available the following school year.” Id. The Fifth Circuit 
affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the school district, agreeing with its 
finding that the teachers had not applied for subsequent vacancies at the school district. Id. at 1022. 
 69. Id. at 1018. The teachers also brought claims under the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act and the Employee Retirement Income Security Act. Id. at 1018 n.1. 
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The Fifth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the State defendants.70 
The court stated that an employment relationship between the State 
defendants and the teachers would not exist unless the defendants had the 
right to control the teacher’s conduct.71 The Fifth Circuit stated that the only 
evidence the teachers provided with respect to control was the State’s 
administration of the exam and its ability to decertify teachers who failed the 
exam.72 The court noted that there was no evidence in the record that the 
State played any role in the general hiring or firing of teachers, or in their 
daily supervision.73 The court stated that the evidence before the district court 
“suggested no more than a licensing relationship between the State and the 
teachers.”74 The court compared the State’s role with respect to the teacher 
test to that of state bar administrators and other state licensing or certification 
agencies, which are not considered employers for the purposes of Title VII.75  
2. Seventh Circuit: The State Cannot Be Liable Because It Does Not 
Do the Actual Hiring and Firing of Teachers 
The Seventh Circuit has indicated that a state cannot be liable under 
federal anti-discrimination laws because it does not hire or fire teachers. In 
EEOC v. Illinois,76 a school district terminated two teachers pursuant to a 
mandatory retirement provision of the Illinois school code that was no longer 
valid because of an amendment to the Age Discrimination in Employment 
Act (“ADEA”).77 The Equal Employment Opportunity Commission 
 70. Id. at 1020. 
 71. Id. at 1019. The Fifth Circuit adopted a hybrid “economic realities/common law control test 
for determining the existence of an employment relationship.” Id. Under the test, “the right to control 
an employee’s conduct is considered the ‘most important factor.’” Id. (quoting Broussard v. L.H. 
Bossier, Inc., 789 F.2d 1158, 1160 (5th Cir. 1986)) “[I]f an employer has the right to control and direct 
the work of an individual, not only as to the result to be achieved, but also as to the details by which 
that result is achieved, an employer/employee relationship is likely to exist.” Id. (quoting Spirides v. 
Reinhardt, 613 F.2d 826, 831-32 (D.C. Cir. 1979)). At least eleven additional factors beyond the 
control element may also be considered when assessing the “economic reality” of the supposed 
employment relationship. Id. at 1019-20 & n.4. 
 72. Id. at 1019. A footnote in the teachers’ appellate brief presented evidence regarding state 
funding of facilities, payment of salaries and selection of textbooks. Id. at 1019 n.3. The Fifth Circuit 
did not consider this evidence because it was not presented to the district court. Id. 
 73. Id. at 1020. The court stated that the record indicated that the school district was responsible 
for hiring, firing and transfers, and was listed as the employer on application and personnel forms. Id. 
at n.6.  
 74. Id. at 1020. 
 75. Id. 
 76. 69 F.3d 167 (7th Cir. 1995). 
 77. Id. at 168. The Illinois provision was repealed two years after the ADEA amendment, and 
after the teachers’ termination. Id.  
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(“EEOC”) sued the State of Illinois.78 The EEOC argued that the State 
violated the ADEA because it did not repeal the unlawful provision or notify 
the school districts that the provision was invalid and unenforceable.79  
The Seventh Circuit held that the State could not be liable under an 
interference standard.80 The court stated that a person aggrieved by the 
application of a legal rule cannot sue the rule maker, but only the person 
whose acts hurt him.81 The court argued that because the State did not control 
hiring and firing, it could not be considered the “real” employer of public 
school teachers, despite its extensive regulations of Illinois schools.82 The 
Seventh Circuit noted that the defendant hospital in Sibley actively attempted 
to prevent a nurse from being employed by a hospitalized patient.83 The court 
held that the State’s failure to notify the school district that the mandatory 
retirement statute was invalid did not constitute active interference with 
employment.84 The court noted that there was no evidence that the State of 
Illinois had insisted that school districts comply with the state code after the 
passage of the ADEA amendment.85  
 78. Id. 
 79. Id. 
 80. Id. at 171-72. The court’s holding reversed a judgment against the State in which the EEOC 
had obtained several hundred thousand dollars on behalf of the teachers. Id. at 168. 
 81. Id. at 170 (quoting Quinones v. City of Evanston, 58 F.3d 275, 277 (7th Cir. 1995)). The 
“persons whose acts hurt” the two teachers in this case, according to the Seventh Circuit, were the 
school districts that fired them. Id. at 170.  
 82. Id. at 171. The Seventh Circuit acknowledged that the State of Illinois fixed a minimum 
salary for all teachers, the number of days teachers had to work, the holidays teachers had off, the 
amount of sick leave they were entitled to, their eligibility for and length of sabbatical leave, the 
minimum amount of time for their lunch periods, the terms of teachers’ tenure, the rights of recalled 
teachers, and many other things. Id. However, the court stated that the key powers in suits based on 
discrimination in hiring and firing were the powers to hire and fire. Id. The court noted that if the State 
were telling the local school districts whom to hire and fire and how much to pay them, “a point would 
soon be reached at which the state was the de facto employer and the local school districts merely its 
agents.” Id. at 171-72. However, the court found no suggestion that the State knew about the two 
plaintiffs or wanted them to resign. Id. at 172. The court did not treat the provision of the school code 
requiring retirement at age seventy as a firing directive from the State because the provision was 
invalid, and there was no evidence that the State had made any effort to enforce it. Id. 
 83. Id. at 169. According to the court, in Sibley and in other cases, “the defendant so far 
controlled the plaintiff’s employment relationship that it was appropriate to regard the defendant as the 
de facto or indirect employer of the plaintiff, as where a hospital prevents a nurse from being 
employed by a hospitalized patient.” Id. In this case, the powers of hiring and firing were controlled by 
the school districts, subject only to the tenure provision of the State’s school code. Id. at 171. See also 
supra Part II.B.3 (discussing Sibley). 
 84. Id. at 170. The court held that because the Illinois statute was nullified as soon as the 
amendment to the federal ADEA was passed, due to the Supremacy Clause in the Constitution, the 
State could not be considered to have aided and abetted the school district’s violation. Id. 
 85. Id. at 169-70. 
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3. Ninth Circuit: The State Can Be Liable Because It Interfered With 
the Hiring and Firing of Teachers, and It Was Not Engaged in a 
Licensing Activity  
In Ass’n of Mexican-American Educators v. California (“AMAE”),86 the 
State of California required all elementary and secondary school teachers, as 
well as many non-teaching employees, to pass the California Basic 
Education Skills Test (“CBEST”) in order to serve in its public schools.87 
Minority candidates disproportionately received failing scores on the 
CBEST.88 The plaintiffs included three nonprofit organizations representing 
the interests of minority educators, as well as eight minority job candidates.89 
The defendants were the State of California and the California Commission 
on Teacher Credentialing (“CCTC”).90 The plaintiffs sought to enjoin use of 
the CBEST.91 
The Northern District of California held that the State of California could 
be liable under Title VII for its teacher testing requirements.92 The court 
reasoned that the CBEST was an employment test, rather than a licensing 
exam, because passage of the CBEST was required only for individuals 
seeking employment in California’s public schools.93 The court observed that 
individuals wishing to teach in private schools in California did not need to 
pass the CBEST or be certified by the CCTC.94 The court rejected the 
defendants’ analogy to the bar exam for lawyers, noting that while an 
unsuccessful bar applicant may not hold himself out as a lawyer, an 
unsuccessful CBEST candidate may pursue employment with any private 
school in the State.95  
 86. 231 F.3d 572 (9th Cir. 2000) (en banc). 
 87. See id. at 577-578 (detailing the legislative mandate and administrative response, and 
describing the CBEST, a pass-fail examination consisting of reading, writing and mathematics 
sections). 
 88. Id. 
 89. Id. 
 90. Id. 
 91. Id. The plaintiffs claimed the test had a “disproportionate, adverse impact on minority 
candidates” and that the defendants had “failed to adopt screening procedures with a less adverse 
impact.” Id.  
 92. Ass’n of Mexican-Am. Educators v. California (“AMAE”), 836 F. Supp. 1534, 1549-50 
(N.D. Cal. 1993), aff’d en banc, 231 F.3d 572 (9th Cir. 2000).  
 93. Id. at 1549. 
 94. Id. The court stated that the CBEST was an examination testing “an individual’s qualification 
for a job with a particular employer (the State)” rather than “an examination that tests minimal 
competence for the job of teaching.” Id. at 1550. 
 95. Id. at 1549-50. Three years later, the Northern District of California determined that the 
CBEST had a disparate impact on the plaintiff class. AMAE, 937 F. Supp. 1397, 1406 (N.D. Cal. 
1996), aff’d en banc 231 F.3d 572 (9th Cir. 2000). However, the court determined that the CBEST 
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A Ninth Circuit panel reversed the district court, ruling that the CBEST 
was a licensing exam and thus exempt from Title VII.96 The court held that 
the State was acting in its regulatory capacity rather than creating 
qualifications for its own employees.97 The panel contended that teachers 
were not employees of the State of California.98 The court also noted that the 
Legislature, rather than an administrator responsible for overseeing the 
teachers, had created the requirements.99 The panel, by way of example, 
stated that if the State Legislature required public defenders to pass a Fourth 
Amendment examination, the State would be exercising its police powers to 
protect California citizens and could not be liable under Title VII.100  
Judge Boochever, in dissent, argued that Title VII does not have any 
language creating exceptions for governmental licensing activities.101 The 
dissent argued that if the State, as an employer, administered a test to 
applicants as a condition of employment, the exam would be subject to Title 
VII, even if it were considered a licensing exam or characterized as an 
exercise of the State’s regulatory power.102 The majority’s ruling, according 
to Judge Boochever, left minority teachers without a remedy if states 
imposed certification requirements that were invalid and had a disparate 
impact.103 The dissent argued that plaintiffs under these circumstances would 
not be able to sue their direct employers, the school districts, because the 
districts did not require or administer the teacher tests.104  
tested skills that were job-related, and was a valid measure of those basic skills.Id. at 1419. The court 
also found that the plaintiffs failed to show the existence of a viable alternative to the CBEST that 
“would have a significantly smaller adverse impact on the members of the plaintiff class.” Id. at 1426. 
The plaintiffs appealed these findings, while the defendants cross-appealed the district court’s earlier 
finding that Title VII could apply to the CBEST. AMAE, 195 F.3d 465, 472 (9th Cir. 1999), rev’d en 
banc, 231 F.3d 572 (9th Cir. 2000). 
 96. Id. at 484. The court stated that the principle behind the licensing exception was that a state 
would not be liable under Title VII for “interference” with an employment relationship if the alleged 
interference involved an exercise of the state’s regulatory responsibilities. Id. at 483. 
 97. Id. at 484. 
 98. Id. (citing Gonzales v. California, 105 Cal. Rptr. 804 (Cal. Ct. App. 1972)). 
 99. Id. at 484. 
 100. Id. Because it concluded that the test was a valid licensing exam, and thus exempt from 
liability under Title VII, the panel did not decide whether the exam could constitute an actionable 
interference with an employment relationship. Id. 
 101. Id. at 496 (Boochever, J., dissenting). 
 102. Id. Judge Boochever contended that in the “licensing” cases, the courts exempted the 
licensing entities from Title VII because they lacked an employment relationship with the employees, 
not because their activities were characterized as licensing activities. Id. 
 103. Id. at 499.  
 104. Id. The dissent noted that:  
Only the state Legislature possesses the constitutional authority to regulate public school teacher 
hiring on a statewide level, such as by imposing a credentialing requirement like the CBEST, but 
under the majority opinion, the State is not subject to Title VII because it is not a direct employer. 
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The Ninth Circuit granted a rehearing en banc,105 and held that teacher 
tests are employment tests, not licensing tests administered solely pursuant to 
a state’s exercise of its regulatory power, and are thus subject to Title VII 
liability.106 The majority stated that interference with employment 
opportunities is sufficient to create Title VII liability.107 The court contended 
that the State interfered with the plaintiffs’ employment opportunities with 
local school districts by requiring, implementing, and administering the 
CBEST, because the State used the CBEST to dictate whom the school 
districts could and could not hire.108  
On the other hand, local school districts, which are the direct employers, are not subject to Title 
VII because it is the State and CTC that require and administer the CBEST. Given these 
circumstances, as a practical matter, the majority’s reading of Title VII leaves minority public 
school teachers without any of the protections afforded by Title VII to challenge a state-imposed 
employment practice such as the CBEST. 
Id. The dissent argued that the State should be treated as the plaintiffs’ employer, because there was 
substantial evidence that it participated in or influenced the employment policies of local school 
districts. Id. at 497-99. The dissent contended that Gonzales, 105 Cal. Rptr. at 804-09, the case relied 
on by the majority for the proposition that public school teachers are not state employees, only held 
that the State would not be liable for the torts of local school districts or their employees. AMAE, 195 
F.3d at 497-98 n.3. The dissent argued that Gonzales did not address whether the State could be 
subject to Title VII for its efforts to regulate education. Id. Finally, Judge Boochever argued that even 
if the State were not considered the teachers’ direct employer, it could still be subject to Title VII if it 
discriminatorily interfered with the employment opportunities of teachers with local public school 
districts. Id. at 499. 
 105. AMAE, 208 F.3d 786 (9th Cir. 2000). The court did not cite any reasons for granting the 
rehearing. Id. 
 106. 231 F.3d at 584. 
 107. Id. at 580. The majority acknowledged that teachers were employees or potential employees 
of individual school districts, rather than the State. Id. 
 108. Id. at 581. The court argued that the Fifth Circuit might have ruled differently in Fields if 
there had been evidence of the state’s right to control the work of the teachers. Id. at 583. The Ninth 
Circuit, noting California’s extensive control over its school districts, had “no difficulty” concluding 
that the State was in a position where it could interfere with the employment decisions of local school 
districts. Id. at 581-82. The majority noted that California public schools’ establishment, regulation 
and operation were covered by the State Constitution and the State Legislature. Id. at 581. “Unlike 
most states, California school districts have budgets that are controlled and funded by the state 
government rather than the local districts.” Id. at 581 (quoting Belanger v. Madera Unified Sch. Dist., 
963 F.2d 248, 251 (9th Cir. 1992)). California statutes regulate “district organization, elections, and 
governance; educational programs, institutional materials, and proficiency testing; sex discrimination 
and affirmative action; admission standards; compulsory attendance; school facilities; rights and 
responsibilities of students and parents; holidays; school health, safety, and nutrition; teacher 
credentialing and certification; rights and duties of public school employees; and the pension system 
for public school teachers.” Id. at 581-82 (quoting Butt v. California, 842 P.2d 1240, 1254 (Cal. 
1992)). The State also “dictates when students may be expelled or suspended, and...exerts control over 
the textbooks that are used in public schools.” Id. at 582 (quoting Belanger, 963 F.2d at 253). The 
majority noted that the State was so entangled with the operation of California’s local school districts 
that individual districts were treated as “state agencies” for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment. Id. 
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The Ninth Circuit stated that there is no overarching “licensing” 
exception to Title VII, and held that the “licensing” cases did not apply.109 
The court stated that in the licensing cases, licensing was the entire 
connection between the plaintiffs and the defendants; in this case, the 
CBEST was but one aspect of pervasive state control of the school 
districts.110 Additionally, the court found that because the CBEST applied 
only to public school employees, the state was acting as an employer, as well 
as through its regulatory power.111 The majority stated that the licensing 
exemption could only exist if the state required all teachers to pass the 
CBEST.112  
Judge Kleinfeld, in a dissent joined by Judge O’Scannlain, argued that the 
majority’s holding needlessly created a split among the circuit courts,113 and 
exposed the State of California to expensive and time-consuming 
litigation.114  
Judge Gould, in a dissent joined by Judges Kleinfeld and O’Scannlain, 
argued that the United States Supreme Court required a clear expression of 
 109. Id. at 582-83. 
 110. Id. at 582. 
 111. Id. at 583. 
 112. Id. at 584. The Ninth Circuit ultimately concluded that the “district court did not clearly err in 
concluding that the CBEST was validated properly.” Id. at 589. The holdings regarding Title VII’s 
applicability are nevertheless binding in the Ninth Circuit, even though decision of that issue was 
arguably unnecessary to the case. See United States v. Johnson, 256 F.3d 895, 915 (9th Cir. 2001) 
(“where the court heard evidence and argument from both parties, and specifically ruled on the issue, a 
party may not escape the ruling’s binding effect on the ground that it was not logically essential to the 
court’s ultimate determination.”) (citing United States v. Weems, 49 F.3d 528, 532 (9th Cir. 1995)). 
See also id. at 914 & n.6 (noting that as early as Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803), 
appellate courts have found it appropriate to resolve several issues in a case, where each could be 
dispositive, “in order to avoid repetition of errors on remand or provide guidance for future cases.”). 
See also id. at 915 (stating that much circuit law would be put in doubt, creating substantial 
uncertainty, if lawyers and clients had to guess as to whether a later panel would identify a prior panel 
ruling as unnecessary). Judge Reinhardt and two other circuit judges dissented from this aspect of the 
ruling and argued that the test was not validated properly. AMAE, 231 F. 3d at 594-95 (Reinhardt, J., 
dissenting). 
 113. Id. at 602 (Kleinfeld, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Id. at 600. Judge 
Kleinfeld’s dissent argued that the majority’s decision that the test was properly validated rendered the 
Title VII discussion moot.  Judge Kleinfeld noted that the court could have assumed, without deciding 
that the state was potentially liable under Title VII. Id. at 600-01 Judge Kleinfeld argued:  
In this case, our reaching out to hold that Title VII applies to non-employers opens the door to 
more litigation, instead of shutting it. We have now created a circuit split on a national issue of 
great importance. As Judge Gould points out, all the other circuits to have ruled on whether Title 
VII (or the analogously construed ADEA provision) applies to non-employers such as state 
licensing boards have gone the other way. 
Id. at 602. 
 114. Id. at 602. “I doubt that the State of California really wants to know that now it may have to 
spend hundreds of thousands, maybe millions of dollars, and years of litigation, validating 
examinations and possibly all the other screening it does of all licensed professions.” Id.  
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congressional intent before a federal statute could limit a state’s traditional 
police powers, which include the establishment and regulation of a public 
school system.115 Congress, according to Judge Gould, had not shown any 
intent to extend Title VII liability to states that indirectly affected 
employment prospects in the course of exercising their police powers.116 
Judge Gould argued that the removal by Congress of the states’ exemption 
from Title VII was meant to protect only those actually employed by state 
governments or their subdivisions.117 Judge Gould argued that the critical 
concern underlying the “licensing” exemption from Title VII was not the 
extent of the state’s involvement in the regulated activity, but rather “the 
principle that courts should not infer a congressional intent to regulate in 
areas of peculiarly state concern.”118 Finally, Judge Gould contended that 
California was using the testing requirements in a purely regulatory fashion, 
and argued that the decision not to require private school teachers to pass the 
exam constituted a rational exercise of the State’s police power.119 
D. Commentators’ Perspectives on Policy Considerations 
1. Ensuring That Prospective Teachers Have a Remedy for 
Employment Discrimination 
Plaintiffs must show that an employment relationship with the defendant 
existed to establish a prima facie claim under Title VII.120 Strassle and 
Finnerty contend that courts must adopt a broad conception of what 
constitutes an employment relationship to ensure that plaintiffs are able to 
sue the parties that caused their injuries.121 If courts strictly construe the term 
“employer” to include only those with direct hiring and firing powers, 
 115. Id. at 604- 05. (Gould, J., dissenting). 
 116. Id. at 604. 
 117. Id.  
 118. Id. at 605. The majority’s argument that the State had more than a licensing relationship with 
the school districts and teachers was therefore irrelevant to Judge Gould. Id. 
 119. Id. at 606. For example, Judge Gould noted that the California Constitution created a special 
duty for the State to “ensure basic educational equality” in its public schools. Id. 
 120. Strassle, supra note 37, at 510. To establish a prima facie claim under Title VII, a plaintiff 
must also establish (1) disparate impact; (2) that the defendant was responsible for the challenged act 
or decision; and (3) that the challenged act or decision was a deprivation of an employment 
opportunity protected under Title VII. Id. 
 121. See id. at 514-15; see also Kevin Finnerty, Comment, The Ninth Circuit Does Its Homework 
and Leaves the Supreme Court with an Assignment: Settle the Question Whether Title VII’s 
Antidiscrimination Provisions Apply to States Requiring Public School Teachers to Pass Certification 
Examinations, 95 NW. U. L. REV. 1569, 1601 (2001) (noting that a particular school district will have 
little choice but to follow state mandates, and adding that justice dictates allowing the plaintiff to sue 
the entity that caused his or her injury).  
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plaintiffs may not be able to sue those who set the certification standards, 
because those setting the standards may not perform the hiring.122 
Additionally, the school districts who do the hiring and firing may escape 
liability because they are merely following state mandates.123  
2. Ensuring That Those Who Discriminate Are Held Accountable 
Strassle and Rogers argue that courts must extend the application of Title 
VII to hold the state authorities who establish certification standards 
accountable under Title VII for any resulting discriminatory impact.124 
Finnerty argues that the legislative history reveals that Congress was 
primarily concerned with holding the parties who cause discrimination liable, 
regardless of the labels that could be placed on those parties.125 Finnerty adds 
 122. See Strassle, supra note 37, at 514 (arguing that without a broad construction of the term 
“employer,” Title VII relief will be unavailable, because the state agencies developing certification 
standards and tests will not be considered “employers” of the plaintiffs).  
 123. See id.; Finnerty, supra note 121, at 1600. 
 124. Strassle, supra note 37, at 514; see also W. Sherman Rogers, Title VII Preemption of State 
Bar Examinations: Applicability of Title VII to State Occupational Licensing Tests, 32 How. L.J. 582-
83 (1989) (arguing that Title VII’s purpose of eradicating discrimination throughout the economy 
would be frustrated if state agencies administering licensing examinations, which control important 
aspects of individuals’ employment opportunities, were allowed to escape coverage). Strassle 
identifies four additional reasons for a broad construction of the employer-employee relationship: first, 
the Act’s protections are not limited only to “employees” or “applicants for employment” but, rather, 
extend to “any individual.” Strassle, supra, at 511. Second, the legislative history of Title VII reveals a 
congressional intent to “remove barriers to minority admission into the professions wherever 
possible.” Id. at 512. One way to accomplish this goal is to remove artificial barriers to professional 
certification as well as to professional employment. Id. Third, there is a general principle that remedial 
legislation should be “broadly construed to achieve its purposes.” Id. The courts are thus obligated to 
“make sure that the Act works, and the intent of Congress is not hampered by a combination of a strict 
construction of the statute and a battle with semantics.” Id. (quoting Culpepper v. Reynolds Metals, 
421 F.2d 888, 891 (5th Cir. 1970). Finally, the EEOC has shown “little hesitation in extending Title 
VII protection beyond conventional employer-employee relationships,” and there should be deference 
to the interpretations of a statute by the agency responsible for its enforcement. Id. Finnerty proposes 
that the Supreme Court rule that the term “employer,” for purposes of Title VII, should be “interpreted 
broadly to apply to states when they administer certification exams to public school teachers.” 
Finnerty, supra note 121, at 1602.  
 125. Congress recognized that parties other than an individual’s direct employer could cause 
unlawful employment discrimination. See Finnerty, supra note 121, at 1573-74  (noting that an 
interpretative memorandum written during the Senate debate over Title VII stated that “An employer 
who obtains his employees from a union hiring hall through operation of a labor contract is still an 
employer. If the hiring hall discriminates against Negroes, and sends him only white males, he is not 
guilty of discrimination—but the union hiring hall would be.”) (quoting 110 Cong. Rec. S7217 (daily 
ed. Apr. 8, 1964)). When the state determines whom a local school district can hire, the local district is 
not the party that causes the discrimination. Id. Moreover, Finnerty discusses how Congress either 
overruled a variety of Supreme Court decisions outright or made clear that it preferred the decisions be 
interpreted with the Civil Rights Act of 1991. Id. at 1579-80. Finnerty notes that “[I]n addition to 
codifying Griggs and reversing numerous Court decisions, Congress also . . . reminded the Court that 
when civil rights statutes are open to alternative interpretations, it should ‘select the construction 
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that the concept of a “licensing” exception is not supported by Title VII’s 
language or its legislative history.126  
III. ANALYSIS 
The federal courts are sharply divided on whether states who require 
teachers to pass tests to begin or continue their employment can be liable 
under Title VII. The Fifth Circuit has held that states cannot be liable, 
because the states’ role in administering teacher testing creates no more than 
a licensing relationship.127 The Seventh Circuit has indicated that states 
cannot be liable because they do not possess hiring and firing powers.128 
Conversely, the Ninth Circuit has held that a state that requires only its public 
school teachers to pass an exam prior to employment can be liable under 
Title VII for interfering with the hiring and firing of a school district’s 
teachers.129 
Teacher testing clearly raises Title VII concerns. The suits in AMAE, 
Fields, and other jurisdictions, as well as numerous studies, illustrate the 
tests’ discriminatory impact on minority applicants.130 There is a contentious 
debate regarding whether the tests have a manifest relationship to the job of 
teaching.131 Moreover, under the doctrine established by the Supreme Court 
in Griggs v. Duke Power Co., plaintiff teachers may also succeed by proving 
that other, less discriminatory tests could advance the states’ interests.132 
Sibley Memorial Hospital v. Wilson133 and the long line of cases adopting 
its holding reflect a consensus among the federal courts that interference with 
employment relationships is sufficient to subject an entity to Title VII 
liability, even without a direct employment relationship.134 The Ninth Circuit 
which most effectively advances the underlying congressional purpose to provide equal opportunity 
and to provide effective remedies.’” Id.  
 126. Finnerty argues there is no textual support in Title VII for exempting states when they act in 
their regulatory capacities. Id. at 1591. Congress did not create any such exception when it amended 
Title VII to encompass state and local governments. Id. See also Teal, supra note 45, at 449 
(discussing the 1972 amendments, noting that “The Committee Reports and the floor debates stressed 
the need for equality of opportunity for minority applicants seeking to obtain governmental positions” 
and that “Congress voiced its concern about the widespread use by state and local governmental 
agencies of ‘invalid selection techniques’ that had a discriminatory impact.”). 
 127. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 128. See supra Part II.C.2. 
 129. See supra Part II.C.3. 
 130. See supra notes 29, 67-68, 86-91 and accompanying text. 
 131. See supra Part II.B.2. 
 132. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
 133. See supra Part II.B.3. 
 134. Id. 
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based its AMAE decision on this principle.135 One of the shortcomings of the 
Fifth Circuit’s decision in Fields is that the court did not address Sibley or 
any of the other cases that have held that interference is sufficient to subject 
an employer to Title VII liability.136  
The Seventh Circuit’s attempt to distinguish the Sibley line of cases in 
EEOC v. Illinois is unconvincing. The Seventh Circuit suggested that in 
Sibley, the hospital could be considered the de facto or indirect employer of 
the plaintiff nurse, because it had the power to prevent the nurse from being 
employed by a hospitalized patient.137 Under this analysis, states that use 
their power to prevent school districts from employing prospective teachers 
should also be liable as de facto or indirect employers. Surprisingly, the 
Seventh Circuit reached the opposite conclusion and held that a state could 
not be liable when its statute prompted a school district to dismiss teachers.138 
The Seventh Circuit’s narrow interpretation of the “interference” standard 
may allow third parties to accomplish indirectly what employers are 
otherwise prohibited from doing.139 
Congress, by removing the exemption for state and local governments 
and educational institutions from Title VII in 1972, clearly demonstrated a 
desire to eliminate discrimination in the employment of teachers.140 
However, the circuit courts, including the Ninth Circuit, have held that Title 
VII does not apply to the licensing efforts of public agencies that are 
designed to protect the public by limiting entry into certain professions.141 
The Ninth Circuit’s determination that the State of California was not 
involved in a licensing activity because it was only requiring public school 
teachers to pass the state’s teacher exam is unpersuasive—a state may have 
legitimate reasons for restricting entry into the public segments of a 
profession (such as public defenders), while placing fewer or no restrictions 
on the profession’s private component.142 The Fifth and Seventh Circuits, by 
ruling that states enjoy immunity from Title VII if they are engaged in 
licensing activities, have partially restored the exemptions of state and local 
governments and educational institutions from Title VII that Congress 
removed in 1972.143  
 135. See supra notes 107-08 and accompanying text. 
 136. See supra Part II.C.1. 
 137. See supra note 83 and accompanying text. 
 138. See supra notes 84-85 and accompanying text. 
 139. See supra notes 48-49 and accompanying text. 
 140. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text. 
 141. See supra notes 57-63, 73, 75, 96-100, 115-19 and accompanying text. 
 142. See supra notes 100, 119 and accompanying text. 
 143. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text.   
 
Washington University Open Scholarship
p561 Blotevogel book pages.doc10/27/03   12:55 PM 
 
 
 
 
 
584 WASHINGTON UNIVERSITY LAW QUARTERLY [VOL. 81:561 
 
 
 
 
 
The effort to end discriminatory employment practices should not be 
eviscerated because of a desire to defer to states’ licensing activities.144 
Gould’s dissent in AMAE II indicates that the support for states’ immunity 
from Title VII for their licensing activities stems from concerns with 
preserving state autonomy and the proper balance between state and federal 
power.145 However, Congress, citing the pervasive employment 
discrimination that existed among state and local governments, consciously 
chose to subject state and local governments to Title VII liability.146 Neither 
the Fifth nor the Seventh Circuits have contended that a state, through its 
licensing authority, could discriminate against its own employees without 
subjecting itself to Title VII.147 The rationale of Sibley and its progeny 
applies to public and private employers: no employer should be allowed to 
circumvent Title VII’s prohibition of employment discrimination by 
resorting to indirect interference.148 
The current split among the circuit courts works to the detriment of all 
parties. Teacher testing is a key component of education reform in more than 
forty states,149 as states respond to increasing pressure from their constituents 
and the federal government to use testing to assure the competence of  
educators.150 However, the Ninth Circuit’s holding in AMAE, in addition to 
numerous lawsuits filed throughout the country, indicates that states’ 
implementation of testing requirements can lead to ongoing litigation and 
substantial costs.151 School districts, teachers’ direct employers and the 
proper parties to sue according to the Fifth Circuit in Fields152 and the 
 144. See supra notes 101-04, 123-25 and accompanying text.  
 145. See supra notes 115-19 and accompanying text. 
 146. See supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text. 
 147. See supra note 101 and accompanying text.  
 148. See supra Part II.B.3. For example, a teacher certification scheme restricting certification to 
Caucasians would seem to implicate Title VII, even though the applicants for teacher positions would 
be hired by school districts, rather than the state, even if the certification scheme was considered an 
assertion of a state’s licensing power. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 2000e-2(a) (2000). 
 149. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 150. See supra notes 1-4, 42 and accompanying text. 
 151. See supra note 29 and accompanying text. See also Diana Pullin, Key Questions in 
Implementing Teacher Testing and Licensing, 30 J.L. & EDUC. 383, 385 (2001) (stating that teacher 
testing litigation based on unlawful race-based discrimination against minority teachers is likely to 
increase, due to the increased visibility and utilization of teacher testing). See also id. at 398 (“The 
dual issues of whether a teacher test is a licensure test or an employment test and whether a potential 
cause of action rests against the state administering the test or the local school relying upon passage of 
a teacher test in order to hire an individual will be of critical importance in future litigation of federal 
law claims.”).  
 152. See supra note 73 and accompanying text.  
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Seventh Circuit in EEOC v. Illinois,153 may be held liable under Title VII for 
merely complying with state mandates.154  
Finally, as the Ninth Circuit and various commentators have noted, 
minority applicants for teaching positions who are excluded from 
employment due to discriminatory teacher testing requirements may not have 
a Title VII remedy in jurisdictions that treat states as immune from Title VII, 
even though Title VII has ostensibly protected them from such 
discrimination for more than thirty years.155 Courts may invoke fairness 
considerations to insulate school districts from liability when their hiring 
decisions are dictated by state policies.156 Moreover, even if the local school 
districts can be liable, organizations representing minority educators will not 
have access to a full remedy, because any equitable relief (such as an 
injunction stopping a discriminatory testing requirement) could only be 
imposed on the local district.157 Additionally, the ability of Title VII to deter 
states from imposing discriminatory teacher testing requirements will be 
compromised if the states cannot be held liable.158 The absence of a full Title 
VII remedy would remove a critical weapon against discrimination.159  
The split among the circuit courts creates tremendous uncertainty,160 
without providing clear protection to any party. A unified approach that 
accommodates the goals of education reform and nondiscrimination is 
needed to avoid litigation and ensure justice.  
IV. PROPOSAL 
A legislative solution is needed to address the concerns of states, school 
districts, and minority teaching applicants. The courts are unlikely to resolve 
 153. See supra note 82 and accompanying text. 
 154. See supra note 28 and accompanying text. 
 155. See supra notes 53-56, 103-04, 121-23 and accompanying text. 
 156. Id.  
 157. For example, in AMAE, organizations representing minority educators sought injunctive 
relief. See supra notes 89-91 and accompanying text. If those plaintiffs had prevailed in a jurisdiction 
that did not recognize the State as a proper defendant, they would only be able to secure relief on a 
piece-meal, case-by-case basis. 
 158. See supra note 49 and accompanying text (stating that Title VII cannot be effective if 
employers are allowed to discriminate indirectly by interfering with a plaintiff’s opportunities to be 
employed by a third party); see also supra notes 123-25 and accompanying text (arguing that Title VII 
cannot be effective if states can impose discriminatory policies without facing any consequences). 
 159. See Pullin, supra note 151, at 398 (noting that Title VII “provides some of the most powerful 
federal law claims that can be presented against a program where there are significant race, ethnicity, 
or gender disparities in success rates.”); see also supra note 56 and accompanying text (arguing that 
permitting discrimination in educational settings will create unique setbacks for efforts to eliminate 
discrimination). 
 160. See, e.g., supra notes 113-14 and accompanying text. 
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the competing concerns of the parties, due to their institutional constraints,161 
tendency to defer to state education officials,162 and recent unwillingness to 
construe civil rights statutes broadly.163 Accordingly, the United States 
Congress should resolve the split among the circuit courts through a statute 
amending and clarifying Title VII. The statute should contain the following 
elements:  
§ 1. (a) The phrase “or otherwise to discriminate against any individual” 
within 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1)164 includes, but is not limited to, any 
conduct by a public or private employer that interferes with an individual’s 
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment with another 
employer.  
(b) The conduct of a public or private employer shall be subject to § 1(a) 
notwithstanding its characterization as a licensing activity, regulatory 
activity, exercise of police power, or other activity designed to protect the 
public welfare. 
 161. One inherent constraint on courts’ effectiveness derives from their institutional limitations. 
MICHAEL A. REBELL & ARTHUR R. BLOCK, EDUCATIONAL POLICYMAKING AND THE COURTS 5-18 
(1982). A number of concerns have traditionally been raised regarding the social utility of court action. 
Id. One question is “whether the parties for whom lawyers speak are sufficiently representative of all 
those interests likely to be affected by a court order.” Id. at 9. In theory, more affected views and 
interests will be represented during the policy deliberations of legislatures, as they are not limited to 
the case and parties at hand. Id. A separate concern is that any generalized remedies created by a court 
would “impinge on the interests of groups not represented in the litigation.” Id. Critics of court-
imposed solutions also note that the common law system emphasizes a piecemeal approach to data 
gathering that relies on the competing parties to provide information to the court, and that excludes 
valuable (from a public policy standpoint) evidence from books, articles and reports as “hearsay.” Id. 
at 11. More generally, where issues are presented in a case-by-case format, judges have little occasion 
to make a broad policy review or to consider the overall implications and consequences of specific 
orders. Id. at 14. While advocates of change through the court system have answers for many of these 
objections (see id.), these objections should not be overlooked. 
 162. See Latham Fernandez, Comment, TAAS and GI Forum v. Texas Education Agency: A 
Critical Analysis and Proposal for Redressing Problems with the Standardized Testing in Texas, 33 
ST. MARY’S L.J. 143, 145 (2001) (“By granting states unmitigated latitude in education policies . . . 
the judiciary has effectively denied those members of our community with the least status and least 
political access any remedy against policies that unfairly affect them or their children.”). 
 163. Finnerty, “hopes” the Court will have “learned from its previous Title VII decisions—both 
good (Griggs) and bad (Wards Cove).” Finnerty, supra note 121, at 1602. Wards Cove is by far the 
more recent decision. See supra note 36 and accompanying text (discussing the decisions and the Civil 
Rights Act of 1991). One would therefore expect that it might be the more accurate predictor of future 
Court action. See also Civil Rights Act of 1991, supra note 36, at § 3(4) (stating that one of the 
purposes of the Act was “to respond to recent decisions of the Supreme Court by expanding the scope 
of relevant civil rights statutes in order to provide adequate protection to victims of discrimination.”). 
 164. Under Title VII, it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer “to fail or refuse to 
hire or discharge any individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individual  . . . because of 
such individual’s race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) (2000) 
(emphasis added). The proposed section codifies the holdings of the Sibley line of cases to include any 
conduct that interferes with another employment relationship. See supra Part II.B.3. 
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§ 2. A state, territory, or any governmental body within the United States 
that limits employment in a profession to individuals who successfully 
complete an employment test or some other certification procedure shall 
have:  
(a) a full affirmative defense to actions commenced under 42 U.S.C. 
§ 2000e-2 if it has received a written authorization from the Equal 
Employment Opportunity Commission stating that its certification procedure 
is job related for the position in question and consistent with business 
necessity, or is otherwise consistent with the Uniform Guidelines on 
Employee Selection Procedures.165  
(b) in the case of a governmental body that is not a state or territory, a full 
affirmative defense to actions commenced under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 if it 
proves by a preponderance of the evidence that its actions were limited to 
compliance with an otherwise legally valid166 mandate of a statute or 
comparable authority issued by the state or territory with controlling 
authority in its jurisdiction. 
This statute balances the competing interests involved when state teacher 
testing requirements have a disparate impact on minority applicants. States 
who impose teacher testing requirements that are discriminatory and either 
(1) without a valid business justification, or (2) implemented instead of 
effective, less discriminatory alternatives will be subject to Title VII because 
of the expanded definition of liability established in § 1. The expansion of 
 165. Congress endorsed the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, which had 
been adopted by several federal agencies to help employers develop tests that were consistent with 
Title VII, in the Civil Rights Act of 1991. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I) (1991), reprinted in 1991 
U.S.C.C.A.N. 549, 573. The Guidelines have been adopted as regulations by the Departments of 
Justice, Labor, Treasury, the EEOC, and the Civil Service Commission, the predecessor to the Office 
of Personnel Management. H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at 573, H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(II) (1991), 
reprinted in 1991 U.S.C.C.A.N. 694, at 703. Under the 1991 Act, the standard set forth in Albemarle 
and in the Uniform Guidelines is applicable to written tests and most other objective selection 
procedures.  H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at 573. By 1991, the Guidelines had remained in effect for more 
than a dozen years under three Presidents and five Attorney Generals.  H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(II), at 
703. The committees noted that the Uniform Guidelines have been recognized by the American 
Psychological Association as being consistent with the standards of the psychological profession for 
showing the validity of tests.  H.R. REP. NO. 102-40(I), at 573-74,  H.R. Rep. No. 102-40(II), at 703-
04. The Judiciary Committee stated that the Guidelines “represent the interpretation of Griggs applied 
by the federal government in enforcing Title VII.” Id. at 704. 
 166. The phrase “an otherwise legally valid mandate” is intended to remove immunity when the 
state mandate is clearly invalid because of conflicting federal legislation, such as in EEOC v. Illinois. 
See supra Part II.C.2. A state mandate could also be considered not “legally valid” if it were declared 
unlawful or unconstitutional by a court of law. The phrase “an otherwise” is necessary to ensure that 
the district’s immunity is preserved if the state’s mandate is invalid only because of Title VII. 
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Title VII’s scope is needed to ensure remedies for plaintiffs and deter future 
misconduct.167  
The statute also provides more definite protection from litigation to states 
and school districts than currently exists. The statute creates a mechanism to 
limit litigation through § 2(a), which allows the EEOC to “pre-validate” 
particular certification requirements. Additionally, § 2(b) provides much 
needed protections for school districts, creating a full affirmative defense for 
local governments who are merely complying with state mandates. 
This statutory scheme provides minority populations with a weapon to 
challenge state certification requirements that are not job related for the 
positions in question and consistent with “business necessity,” while 
providing safe harbors to states and school districts to reduce the threat of 
unrestricted litigation. Concerns with potential litigation could be further 
addressed through the establishment of carefully crafted legislative 
exceptions for particular exams,168 or a mandate that the EEOC make 
validation services available to public employers, with such validations 
carrying presumptive weight in a court of law.169 
V.  CONCLUSION 
The trend toward teacher testing as a condition of professional 
certification is likely to continue. Litigation regarding its potentially disparate 
impact is likely to significantly increase over the next few years, considering 
the controversies that have arisen with standardized testing in general, and 
 167. This would render state licensing examinations subject to the usual framework for 
employment testing. See supra Part II.A. See also supra notes 53-56 and accompanying text 
(describing legislative findings regarding the need for Title VII to cover state and local government 
employers and educational institutions). See also Rogers, supra note 124, at 620-21 (advocating the 
application of Title VII to state licensing activities, adding that “[i]t is too clear to require argument 
that legislation prohibiting the use of employment tests that have the effect of discriminating against 
racial minorities or women would constitute ‘appropriate legislation’ to enforce the equal protection 
clause of the fourteenth amendment.”). 
 168. For example, legislation could state that long-standing certification exams (e.g., for dentists, 
veterinarians, lawyers, and doctors) are not subject to Title VII liability so long as they are reasonably 
related to the state’s interest. This would eliminate the third component of the Griggs regime, wherein 
an employer’s testing can be found pretextual whenever less discriminatory but equally effective 
alternatives can be found. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. While Congress could also confer 
absolute immunity for such exams, such a move would eliminate a critical check that may become 
necessary if the exams become more pernicious through the revision process. 
 169. See Strassle, supra note 37, at 517 (noting that several federal regulatory agencies have 
adopted the Uniform Guidelines on Employee Selection Procedures, which are designed to provide 
guidance for the use of employment selection standards). “The Guidelines require documented 
evidence of a test’s validity whenever a test has an adverse impact on minorities.” Id. See also supra 
note 165 and accompanying text. 
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teacher testing in particular. The adoption of legislation that carefully 
balances the interests of minority populations in combating discrimination 
and of states and school districts in creating and implementing legitimate 
licensing requirements is necessary to bolster social justice while resolving a 
split within the federal court system. 
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